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EATON v. TOWN OF WELLS:
A CRITICAL COMMENT
Orlando E. Delogu*
When the highest court of any jurisdiction loses its courage or its
compass, the larger interests of justice are seldom well served. This is
precisely what happened here. The Eaton1 case which began in late 1997
involved the claimed right of Mr. Eaton to ownership of some 2,200 linear
feet of dry sand and intertidal land area adjacent to some 44 beachfront lots
in the Town of Wells.2 Arising from his asserted ownership of these areas,
Mr. Eaton also sought to limit the public's use of these dry sand and
intertidal land areas to those uses (fishing, fowling, and navigation)
outlined a decade ago in the now famous Moody Beach cases? The Town
of Wells, however, also claimed to have record title to the areas in question
and/or to have acquired title by adverse possession. The Town also argued
that with respect to the question of public use rights the Moody Beach
cases were not controlling-that, unlike Moody Beach, a broadened range
of public use rights reaching back almost 100 years (including strolling,
sunbathing, picnicking, swimming, and other recreational beachfront
activities) could be shown to have existed here. The town was prepared to
argue that this broadened range of public uses, on and within the particular
* Professor of Law, University of Maine School of Law; B.S., 1960 University of Utah;
M.S., 1963, J.D., 1966, University of Wisconsin.
1. See Eaton v. Town of Wells, 760 A.2d 232 (Me. 2000). The State of Maine, through
the Office of the Attorney General, was an intervener in this case for the limited purpose of
raising anew public trust issues decided adversely to the State's (and the public's) interest
in Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168 (Me. 1989). See Eaton v. Town of Wells, 760 A.2d
at 236.
2. See Eaton v. Town of Wells, 760 A.2d at 237. No competing claims with respect to
any of the 44 beachfront lots were raised or decided in this case. See id.
3. See Bell v. Town of Wells, 510 A.2d 509 (Me. 1986) [hereinafter Bell I]; Bell v. Town
of Wells, 557 A.2d 168 (Me. 1989) [hereinafter Bell II]. Issues surrounding these cases
were addressed in a symposium issue of the Maine Law Review, 42 ME. L REV. 1-158,
(1990); see also, Alison Rieser, Public Trust, Public Use, and Just Compensation, 42 ME.L.
REv. 5 (1990); Orlando Delogu, Intellectual Indifference-Intellectual Dishonesty: The
Colonial Ordinance, The Equal Footing Doctrine, and the Maine Law Court, 42 ME. L.
REV. 43 (1990).
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areas in question, had long ago ripened into a right by prescription-a right
held by the general public and the town.' The Superior Court in its October
20, 1999 Decision and Judgment expressly held that: "[t]he Town of Wells
is an appropriate party to assert the public's right to [a prescriptive]
easement over the property in question.",5
After lengthy preliminary proceedings the lower court held a bifurcated
trial in late 1999 that separated questions of title from questions concerning
the scope of the public's use rights.6 On the title issue, the lower court, in
an Order dated September 20, 1999 and in Findings of Fact and Conclu-
sions of Law dated September 26, 1999 found that Eaton's claim of title
was superior to, and better founded than the claims of the town. The Maine
Supreme Judicial Court sitting as the Law Court subsequently agreed.
They concluded: "[T]he [lower] court did not err in its interpretation of the
deeds and its conclusion that they conveyed the subject premises [to the
Eaton's predecessor's in title]."7 The town's theory of ownership was by
no means frivolous, but both courts found that it was not as fully supported
by the evidence as it needed to be in order to prevail.
As to the scope of the public's use rights in these dry sand and
intertidal land areas, the lower court agreed with the town-the facts here
were unlike those in Moody Beach. Moreover, the lower court did not feel
itself bound by the Superior Court's findings in Bell lI-not only were the
underlying facts different, but the evidentiary showings with respect to
prescriptive uses (and rights gained therefrom) were significantly different
in the two cases; thus the two lower court holdings are not inconsistent with
one another-they simply reach opposite results based on these different
factual settings and evidentiary showings.' The lower court went on to
hold that the town had amply demonstrated a pattern of use sufficient "[t]o
establish on behalf of the general public and the Town of Wells a [prescrip-
tive] right to use the subject premises, both the dry sand and the intertidal
zone, for general recreational purposes, including but not limited to
bathing, sunbathing, picnicking and walking, and beach maintenance."9
Regarding this aspect of the case, the Law Court agreed with the lower
court on each of these points. They noted:
4. See Eaton v. Town of Wells, RE-97-203 at 10 (Me. Super. Ct., York Cty., Oct. 20,
1999) (Kravchuk, C.J.).
5. Id. The Superior Court went onto cite several Maine Law Court cases supporting this
view.
6. See Eaton v. Town of Wells, 760 A.2d at 236.
7. Id. at 242.
8. See Eaton v. Town of Wells, RE-97-203 at 7-9 & n.2.
9. Id. at 20.
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[A]lithough the trial court in the Moody Beach case may have
reached a different conclusion based on the facts of that case, the
trial court in this case is not bound by the trial court in another
case. The determination is a factual issue and the court looks to
the evidence presented in the case before it. Contrary to the
Eatons' contention, the court had ample evidence in this case.10
The Law Court went on to note:
[T]he [lower] court did not err in finding that the Town proved
every element of a prescriptive easement. Because we affirm the
court's judgment concerning the public's and the Town's right to
use the property through prescriptive easement, we need not
address the alternative theory of dedication .... [W]e need not
reach the State's contention that we expand the public trust
doctrine established in Bell v. Town of Wells."
And with a simple "judgment affirmed" the Law Court majority concluded
its opinion. A patient and skillful trial court was sustained in its disposition
of both the property rights issues and the public use rights issues presented
in this case. The property rights dimension of the case was and remains
unremarkable. The lower court andthe Law Court relied on settled cases,
settled reasoning, as well as rules of law with respect to adverse possession
and rules of deed construction of long standing. The better claim of title
was ultimately sustained. But the public use rights dimension of this case
was not resolved by recourse to the settled wisdom of the past. On the
contrary, the town's theory of the case (with respect to this issue) and the
lower court's legal reasoning was bound by and shaped by a single case,
Bell II, a case barely ten years old handed down by a sharply.divided Law
Court, a case that many have come to believe is badly flawed, and
incorrectly decided, the very case the Eaton majority (in a surfeit ofjudicial
restraint) refused to reach or reexamine in its closing line of reasoning
noted above. 2 Some might argue that the town's success on its prescriptive
rights theory precluded the Law Court from addressing its prior holding in
Bell Il-this is little more than the elevation of form over substance, a
dogged adherence to a general principle even when such adherence makes
the rule of law and the Law Court look foolish (to say nothing of the future
problems which Bell II will continue to create). Moreover, there are sound
legal theories, theories embraced by this and predecessor Law Courts that
10. Eaton v. Town of Wells, 760 A.2d at 244.
11. Id. at 246, 248.
12. See Eaton v. Town of Wells, 760 A.2d at 248.
2001]
228 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 6:225
would have allowed the larger questions raised in Bell II to be
reexamined.13 Everyone associated with this case, plaintiffs, defendants,
the State as intervener, and the lower court knew that Bell II loomed over
these proceedings like a 900 pound gorilla. The plaintiff's entire public use
theory (limitation of public uses to fishing, fowling, and navigation) derives
from Bell II. Every witness and every scrap of historical evidence,
including defendant's whole approach to vindicating a broader range of
public use rights, was driven by Bell H and the lower court knew it was
without power to reexamine Bell H. It was bound by the principles of stare
decisis-if public use rights in the foreshore were to be vindicated,
defendant's alternative theory would have to be sustained. Given these
facts, the Law Court's decision not to reach Bell H was unnecessary,
unwise and unfortunate at best; it was an abdication of responsibility at
worst. 14
That the Eaton case turned out well from the standpoint of sustaining
a broadened range of public use rights in this particular 2200 linear feet of
foreshore must be regarded as little more than a fortuity-skillful lawyering
by the town's attorney, a sympathetic lower court judge, a handful of
ancients who lived long enough to offer favorable testimony, some unique
historical data that was admitted into evidence, and some town actions
attested to on the record that suggested a broadened range of public uses for
a long enough period of time to ripen into a prescriptive right. Public use
rights in the foreshore should not be made to turn on such a random
alignment of fortuities. But because Bell H remains the law and dictates
how towns and lower courts must proceed, that is precisely what will
continue to happen. The public will have to continue fighting for a
broadened range of use rights in foreshore areas in town after town, a
thousand yards of beach here, a few hundred feet there. Essentially the
same case will be tried over and over. Some will succeed where the
evidence of a wider range of public uses sustaining a prescriptive right is
compelling and/or where the trial court is sympathetic. Other cases will
fail because records will be lost, the evidence will not be as strong, or a
different trial courtjudge will demand a higher evidentiary standard. What
a waste of time and resources; what a disservice to the bench, the bar,
towns, the public, and shore owners alike. And what will we be left
13. See notes 15-23 infra and accompanying text.
14. In other societal settings we do not allow a limited success, the product of good
fortune or a happy accident, to deflect us from coming to grips with larger underlying
issues-for instance, the cancer patient who for the moment is spared does not deter us from
continuing to look for a cure for the disease, and the fact that a victim of a drunk driver
survives a horrendous crash does not deter us from insisting that drunk driving, the root
problem, be dealt with.
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with-a checkerboard rule of law with respect to public use rights from
Kittery to Eastport.
All of this grows out of the fact that it is only the Law Court that can
correct its own arguably incorrect prior pronouncements-it is only the
Law Court that can reexamine Bell II. To say that it could have, and should
have done so in the Eaton case, would in this writer's view be an under-
statement. But unfortunately, only one member of the Law Court, Justice
Saufley, in a concurring opinion, would have reached this larger issue. She
bluntly states: "I would overrule Bell v. Town of Wells." (Citation omitt-
ed) 5 Quoting liberally from the dissenting opinion in that case and adding
her own views that the majority reasoning in that case was "clearly
flawed,"' 6 she goes on to argue that the Eaton majority should not slavishly
adhere to past precedents that are clearly wrong, particularly precedents
that are of relatively recent origin and thus have not become settled law.
Instead, such cases should be overruled, their debris and misinformation
cleared away, and then, armed with a more correct rule of law (here
presumably, arule of law that would sustain state-wide the broadened range
of foreshore public use rights found in Eaton), we would be in a far better
position than the one we are in now to advance public interests and to sort
out conflicts between shore owners and the public when they arise. 7
This intelligent course urged by one member of the Law Court is not
an abdication of the principles of stare decisis orjudicial activism run wild.
On the contrary, it is both "[c]ommon sense and sound judicial policy
.... ."s Moreover, as Justice Saufley points out, prior, and quite recent,
Maine case law suggests the appropriateness of this very course of conduct.
Justice Saufley cites to us three relatively recent Maine cases that have
discussed settings in which stare decisis, or adherence to a prior holding of
the court, can and should be abandoned. 19 Myrick v. James is perhaps the
15. Eaton v. Town of Wells, 760 A.2d at 248.
16. Id. at249.
17. See id. at 249-50.
18. id. at 250.
19. See id at 249-50, citing Adams v. Buffalo Forge Co., 443 A.2d 932 (Me. 1982)
(revisiting and overturning prior holdings of the court with respect to privity in products
liability cases); Myrick v. James, 444 A.2d 987 (Me. 1982) (revisiting and overturning prior
holdings of the court with respect to when the statute of limitations commences to run in
foreign object malpractice cases); Shaw v. Jendzejec, 717 A.2d 367 (Me. 1998) (revisiting
and adhering to prior holdings of the court with respect to wrongful death actions brought
by parents of a stillborn fetus, but doing so in a context that cites and fully subscribes to the
rationale of the Myrick Court). Adams and Myrick both engage in a discussion of stare
decisis that is well worth reading and seems fully applicable to the issues raised in Eaton.
At one point the Adams court notes: "Whether the doctrine [of stare decisis] should be
applied or avoided is a decision which rests in the discretion of the court. That discretion
2001] 229
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most interesting and useful of these cases because the Law Court in that
case attempts to lay out some guidelines as to when stare decisis should be
abandoned. While acknowledging that other factors may also exist and
come into play in particular settings, a five-factor set of guidelines is laid
out,' which, if found to exist, would suggest the appropriateness of,
perhaps even the need to abandon the prior precedent(s). Justice Saufley
summarizes the five guidelines in a footnote of her concurring opinion, 1
but more importantly, she concludes that the five guidelines are met in the
Eaton case. Moreover, she does not see the Bell or Eaton cases as unique;
in her view "[s]uch disputes are not likely to be rare. Maine has approxi-
mately 3480 miles (5600 kilometers) of coastline .... The potential for
multiple disputes, for continuing uncertainty, and for extensive litigation
is obvious. 22 She goes on as follows: "[T]hus, we should acknowledge the
problems created by our holding in Bell before landowners and the public
are forced through years of uncertainty and unworkable restrictions
founded upon a faulty legal analysis."'23
must be exercised with a view to whether adherence to past error or departure from
precedent constitutes the greater evil to be suffered." Adams v. Buffalo Forge Co., 443 A.2d
at 935 (citations omitted). In avoiding unjust results and undue hardships seemingly dictated
by stare decisis, the Myrick court expresses a preference for distinguishing a prior precedent
of the court, but "[w]here that technique cannot be invoked with integrity.. ." Myrick v.
James, 444 A.2d at 1000, the court would abandon "[a] precedent that is no longer worthy
of application ..... Id. at 1001.
20. See Myrick v. James, 444 A.2d at 1000.
21. See Eaton v. Town of Wells, 760 A.2d at 249-50 n.9: "There are a number of
guiding principles that are called into play when the Court is deciding whether stare decisis
should be applied or avoided. A prior decision may be overruled when: (1) the court is
convinced that the rule of the prior decision operates harshly, unjustly and erratically to
produce, in its case-by-case application, results that are not consonant with prevailing, well-
established conceptions of fundamental fairness and rationally-based justice, (2) that
conviction is buttressed by more than the commitment of the individual justices to their mere
personal preferences, that is, by the substantial erosion of the concepts and authorities upon
which the former rule is founded and that erosion is exemplified by disapproval of those
conceptions and authorities in the better-considered recent cases and in authoritative
scholarly writings, (3) the former rule is the creation of the court itself in the legitimate
performance of its function in filling the interstices of statutory language by interpretation
and construction of vague, indefinite and generic statutory terms, (4) the Legislature has not,
subsequent to the court's articulation of the former rule, established by its own definitive and
legitimate pronouncement either specific acceptance, rejection or revision of the former rule
as articulated by the court, and (5) the court can avoid the most severe impact of an
overruling decision upon reliance interests that may have come into being during the
existence of the former rule by creatively shaping the temporal effect of the new rule
articulated by the holding of the overruling case." Id.
22. Id. at 249.
23. Id.
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What more can, or need, be said? The majority in Eaton did not accede
to Justice Saufley's urging. An opportunity to revisit and almost certainly
correct a relatively recent Law Court decision, Bell II, that at least three
members of the present court have said was incorrectly decidedP has been
lost. Public use rights in the foreshore will continue to be circumscribed
by the crabbed holding in Bell II. Towns and shoreland property owners
as well as members of the public seeking to use the foreshore will proceed
haltingly and uncertainly into the future wondering when, and if, the law
in this area of shared rights will ever be clarified, and what form future
clarifications may take. The irony of Eaton is complete when one
recognizes that the majority opinion in this case was authored by Justice
Wathen, the same Justice Wathen who barely eleven years ago in his
dissenting opinion in Bell II gave us the sound reasoning that Justice
Saufley (and one suspects a majority of the court had they taken the
opportunity) would readily embrace today. But alas, the courage of the past
has been replaced by the timidity of the present-Maine, our judicial
system, and the rule of law is the poorer for it.
24. See Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168, 180 (Me. 1989) (Wathan, J. and Clifford,
J., dissenting); Eaton v. Town of Wells, 760 A.2d at 249 (Saufley, J., concurring).
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